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World First Largest Boat : It was Noah’s Ark
July 22, 2017
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Well It’s amazing to know that world first largest boat was made by Noah’s.It’s is Noah’s Ark.You havent heard this story before but dont worry here its new for you.  In that Ark’s earth every single type of animal can stay.That Ark’s is FOUND in Turkey Mountain.

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Noah’s Ark (Hebrew: Biblical Hebrew: Tevat Noaḥ) is the vessel in the Genesis flood narrative (Genesis chapters 6–9) by which God spares Noah, his family, and a remnant of all the world’s animals from the flood. According to Genesis, God gave Noah instructions for building the ark. Seven days before the deluge, God told Noah to enter the ark with his household and the animals. The story goes on to describe the ark being afloat for 150 days and then coming to rest on the Mountains of Ararat and the subsequent receding of the waters. The story is repeated, with variations, in the Quran, where the ark appears as Safina Nūḥ‎ (Arabic: سفينة نوح‎‎ “Noah’s boat”). The Genesis flood narrative is similar to numerous other flood myths from a variety of cultures. The earliest known written flood myth is the Sumerian flood myth found in the Epic of Ziusudra.

Searches for Noah’s Ark have been made from at least the time of Eusebius (c.275–339 CE) to the present day. There is no scientific evidence for a global flood, and despite many expeditions, no evidence of the ark has been found. The challenges associated with housing all living animal types, and even plants, would have made building the ark a practical impossibility.


Noah in Islam

In contrast to the Jewish tradition, which uses a term that can be translated as a “box” or “chest” to describe the Ark, surah 29:15 of the Quran refers to it as a safina, an ordinary ship, and surah 54:13 describes the ark as “a thing of boards and nails”. Abd Allah ibn Abbas, a contemporary of Muhammad, wrote that Noah was in doubt as to what shape to make the ark, and that Allah revealed to him that it was to be shaped like a bird’s belly and fashioned of teak wood.

Abdallah ibn ‘Umar al-Baidawi, writing in the 13th century, explains that in the first of its three levels wild and domesticated animals were lodged, in the second the human beings, and in the third the birds. On every plank was the name of a prophet. Three missing planks, symbolizing three prophets, were brought from Egypt by Og, son of Anak, the only one of the giants permitted to survive the Flood. The body of Adam was carried in the middle to divide the men from the women. Surah 11:41 says: “And he said, ‘Ride ye in it; in the Name of Allah it moves and stays!'”; this was taken to mean that Noah said, “In the Name of Allah!” when he wished the ark to move, and the same when he wished it to stand still.

Noah spent five or six months aboard the ark, at the end of which he sent out a raven. But the raven stopped to feast on carrion, and so Noah cursed it and sent out the dove, which has been known ever since as the friend of humanity. The medieval scholar Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husayn Masudi (died 956) wrote that Allah commanded the Earth to absorb the water, and certain portions which were slow in obeying received salt water in punishment and so became dry and arid. The water which was not absorbed formed the seas, so that the waters of the flood still exist. Masudi says that the ark began its voyage at Kufa in central Iraq and sailed to Mecca, circling the Kaaba before finally traveling to Mount Judi, which surah 11:44 states was its final resting place. This mountain is identified by tradition with a hill near the town of Jazirat ibn Umar on the east bank of the Tigris in the province of Mosul in northern Iraq, and Masudi says that the spot could be seen in his time.

Judaism :


Talmudic tractates Sanhedrin, Avodah Zarah and Zevahim relate that, while Noah was building the ark, he attempted to warn his neighbors of the coming deluge, but was ignored or mocked. In order to protect Noah and his family, God placed lions and other ferocious animals to guard them from the wicked who tried to stop them from entering the ark. According to one Midrash, it was God, or the angels, who gathered the animals to the ark, together with their food. As there had been no need to distinguish between clean and unclean animals before this time, the clean animals made themselves known by kneeling before Noah as they entered the ark. A differing opinion said that the ark itself distinguished clean animals from unclean, admitting seven pairs each of the former and one pair each of the latter.

According to Sanhedrin 108B, Noah was engaged both day and night in feeding and caring for the animals, and did not sleep for the entire year aboard the ark. The animals were the best of their species, and so behaved with utmost goodness. They abstained from procreation, so that the number of creatures that disembarked was exactly equal to the number that embarked. The raven created problems, refusing to leave the ark when Noah sent it forth and accusing the patriarch of wishing to destroy its race, but as the commentators pointed out, God wished to save the raven, for its descendants were destined to feed the prophet Elijah

According to one tradition, refuse was stored on the lowest of the ark’s three decks, humans and clean beasts on the second, and the unclean animals and birds on the top; a differing interpretation described the refuse as being stored on the utmost deck, from where it was shoveled into the sea through a trapdoor. Precious stones, said to be as bright as the noon sun, provided light, and God ensured that food remained fresh Some more unorthodox interpretations of the ark narrative also surfaced: the 12th-century Jewish commentator Abraham ibn Ezra interpreted the ark as being a vessel that remained underwater for 40 days, after which it floated to the surface.


Festival In The Beach With Lots Of Adventure Activities
May 30, 2017
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They call it Fiesta Del Mar or Festival of the Seas.

The small town of Narvacan in the province of Ilocos Sur held a celebration as part of summer festival and they held the activities in the beach. The town has the adventure center they call Narvacan Outdoor Adventure Hub (NOAH) where the tourists and the locals alike can experience outdoor activities like zipline and hiking.

photo is mine

photo is mine

NOAH is located along the beach area of the said town but aside from the serene beauty of the village there is also the mountain where you can hike up to the top and enjoy the overlooking view of the seas and the plains of the place. Below is the resort where you can stay and order your favorite food or snacks.

The Fiesta Del Mar was held from May 26 and 27 but before these dates there are some activities held the 3×3 basketball.

Activities of the two events include the following:

Ma 26—sports like beach volleyball, futsal, marathon, fun fly or paragliding exhibition, wind surfing, sack race and trail fun walk.

May 27—activities that include beach volleyball finals, futsal- 13 years old below, relaygame/obstacle race, continuation of paragliding exhibition, wind surfing, tug of war, mountain bike race, dance drama competition from coastal barangay and lastly the concert of Cueshe band and the party at the beach.

Some of the sports activities are usually played and performed in the villages but there are activities that are not usually held in the province like paragliding and the wind surfing. The trail fun walk is going to the top of the mountain while the mountain bike race is riding through the circumferential of the town.

The weather also cooperating as the sky is cloudy and a not so strong rain also showered the area. Thousands of people came to participate in the said event.

This is the third year Fiesta Del Mar was held through the administration of Mayor Zuriel Zaragoza.###

There Are Foolish Beings That Like To Do Harm
May 24, 2017

There Are Foolish Beings That Like To Do Harm

By erlymags (@cely/ @lovern)

Anywhere in the world there are foolish beings. They never care if who they hurt really hurt or not. They only feel their excitement to see people sad, cry in despair and die so suddenly. This time, we are war on drugs because of some fools that reside in the country of my residence. I do not know why they like to take illegal drugs then after that do some foolishness that may lead to a heinous crime. The killer drug dominates their brains so they cannot anymore think what is right and wrong. There are so many people affected with the foolishness of people who from the start just like to experiment how good is drug or how it turns out to be after prolonging the taking. Of course, one will become addicted. That is the simplest premise if you take drug you will become a drug addict. It will be the drug that dominates your brain and the entire domains of the human body.

There are indeed pretending to be fools to prosper their desire to play havoc to terrify the world. One island in our country, Ph is now under Martial law. Why is this so? Again, we will go back to foolishness. There are many IS militants already residing in Ph and some Muslims are keeping them so these terrorists continue to terrify the island of Mindanao. It was declared last night by President Duterte Mindanao to be under the state of martial for 60 days to one year. It depends on the situation. If the peace and order situation continues no choice, but to move the law up to one year or forever. We are now affected with the foolishness of some people keeping or hoarding the enemies in their homes. In fact, there is also a university mostly manned by Muslims hide the IS militants, Abusayaffs and other kind of rebels in the vicinity of the campus. That is so weird considering that university is a government run university and used by Muslim administrators to keep the IS militants? That is cheating and treason so the culprits must serve the crime keeping the terrorists.

The world is no facing different killings, bombings and just recently Manchester was on sorrowful situation having 22 died and 50 seriously injured during the concert last night when a bomb blasted the arena. That was a very horrible and scary moment .The killer was also killed by police. That killer was 22 years old, Libyan and so young to become evil. It was told he was normal. The killer has just arrived from his training in Syria. That guy was doing foolishness to life. He should have reassured life. Doing foolishness is not a joke. It may become severe that may end your life and the life of others who love peace.

Image Credit to Yahoo Ph News
Image shown during the Manchester blast

The BBC; turn to the CNN for News
May 23, 2017

Last night there were explosions in Manchester. I heard the report, virtually live, on the BBC.    I had no idea what happened, so despite hearing the blah blah I went to the Web site to see if there was any information.

The Web Site had not been updated, so there was no information concerning the event.

I had something to do, so stepped away from the radio and computer for a time, then returned.

The BBC World Service was still giving blah blah so I brought up the CNN on the computer and found out about the suicide bomber.

This was last night, about six thirty, Jamaica time.

This morning, the BBC was still repeating blah blah, finally coming to the assertion that was previously stated on the CNN about twelve hours ago… that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber who was in the foyer of the area in Manchester arena.

What stunned me by this, was that the change in the BBC has not simply been filling in fifty minutes every hour with worthless blah blah, but the pathetic state of their news reporting.

Years ago, the BBC was virtually all news all the time, and it was all live save recorded interviews or a need to rerun the original statements.   There was no time limit in a news broadcast, and the news was that… NEW.

For some sick reason, the BBC has dumbed itself down to near worthless.

How is it, that last night, while the BBC babbled nonsense, the CNN could pin point what happened, how it happened, and the BBC could not?

How was it that the CNN web page could be giving facts, videos, twelve hours before the BBC?

When there is a new kid on the block, one is forgiving.  A new television station or Internet page gets a kind of ‘bly’ because they are new.

When a radio station like the BBC, which has existed for nearly ninety years, a station which had been highly respected, tumbles into rubbish, it is a time of mourning.

There has been changes in the BBC, none for the better.

That one waits for nearly twelve hours to get what another station broadcast, there needs to be a serious rethink.


At the Center of the Storm
May 22, 2017

At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA is a memoir co-written by former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet with Bill Harlow, former CIA Director of Public Affairs. The book was released on April 30, 2007 and outlines Tenet’s version of 9/11, the War on Terrorism, the 2001 War in Afghanistan, the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, rough interrogation and other events.[1]
On April 29, 2007, Tenet was interviewed about his memoir on 60 Minutes.[2] Tenet outlined the content of his book including allegations that are contrary to the George W. Bush administration positions.
Tenet faced accusations of hypocrisy from former espionage officials on the book’s release date, for not speaking out earlier against the White House’s push to invade Iraq.[3]
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice disputes Tenet’s claim that the Bush administration, before the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, never had a serious debate about whether Iraq posed an imminent threat or whether to tighten existing sanctions.[4]
CIA veteran, Michael Scheuer, states, “Sadly but fittingly, ‘At the Center of the Storm’ is likely to remind us that sometimes what lies at the center of a storm is a deafening silence.”[5]
Robert Baer, author and former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East states, “It’s not that Tenet is responsible for getting us into Iraq. It’s that he failed in not making a full disclosure to Congress and the White House that we were taking a leap into a bottomless black abyss. He should have resigned when he realized Bush would use bad intelligence to deceive the American people. This is what we get when we have a politicized CIA director.”[6]
Douglas Feith, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, whom Tenet criticizes in his book, states: “The problem with George Tenet is that he doesn’t seem to care to get his facts straight. He is not meticulous. He is willing to make up stories that suit his purposes and to suppress information that does not.” In reference to Tenet’s error regarding Richard Perle (see below), Feith wrote that “The date, the physical descriptions, the quotation marks are all, in the words of Gilbert and Sullivan’s ‘Mikado,’ merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.” The memoir, Feith said, “… does offer insight into Mr. Tenet. It allows you to hear the way he talked — fast, loose, blustery, emotional, imprecise, from the ‘gut.’ Mr. Tenet proudly refers to the guidance of his ‘gut’ several times in the book — a strange boast from someone whose stock-in-trade should be accuracy and precision.”[7]
A key conversation with then Pentagon advisor Richard Perle on September 12, 2001, in which Tenet claims Perle told him that “Iraq had to pay for the attack” could not have occurred as Perle was stranded in Paris and did not return to Washington, D.C. until three days later;[4] however, in an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer during an episode of The Situation Room Perle admitted that the two men indeed crossed each other one morning, as claimed by Tenet, but only later in the same week and not on September 12.

United Nations Security Council and the Iraq War
May 22, 2017

In March 2003 the United States government announced that “diplomacy has failed” and that it would proceed with a “coalition of the willing” to rid Iraq under Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction the US insisted it possessed. The 2003 invasion of Iraq began a few days later.

Prior to this decision, there had been much diplomacy and debate amongst the members of the United Nations Security Council over how to deal with the situation. This article examines the positions of these states as they changed during 2002–2003.
Prior to 2002, the Security Council had passed 16 resolutions on Iraq. In 2002, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441.

In 2003, the governments of the US, Britain, and Spain proposed another resolution on Iraq, which they called the “eighteenth resolution” and others called the “second resolution.” This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn when it became clear that several permanent members of the Council would cast ‘no’ votes on any new resolution, thereby vetoing it.[1] Had that occurred, it would have become even more difficult for those wishing to invade Iraq to argue that the Council had authorized the subsequent invasion. Regardless of the threatened or likely vetoes, it seems that the coalition at no time was assured any more than four affirmative votes in the Council—the US, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria—well short of the requirement for nine affirmative votes.[2]

On September 16, 2004 Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, speaking on the invasion, said, “I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.”
Following the passage of Resolution 1441, on 18 November 2002, weapons inspectors of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission returned to Iraq for the first time since being withdrawn by the United Nations. Whether Iraq actually had weapons of mass destruction or not was being investigated by Hans Blix, head of the Commission, and Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Inspectors remained in the country until they withdrew after being notified of the imminent invasion by the United States, Britain, and two other countries.

In early December 2002, Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN. After reviewing the document, UN weapons inspectors, the US, France, United Kingdom and other countries thought that this declaration failed to account for all of Iraq’s chemical and biological agents. Many of these countries had supplied the Iraqi regime with the technology to make these weapons in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq War. On December 19, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Iraq was in “material breach” of the Security Council resolution.

Blix has complained that, to this day, the United States and Britain have not presented him with the evidence which they claim to possess regarding Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
On February 5, 2003, Powell appeared before the UN to prove the urgency to engage a war with Iraq. Although the presentation failed to change the fundamental position of the Security Council, including France, Russia, China, and Germany, Powell succeeded in hardening the overall tone of the United Nations towards Iraq. Powell also noted that Iraq harbored a terrorist network headed by al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (in a small region controlled by Ansar al-Islam). Powell also claimed that Iraqis visited Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and provided training to al-Qaeda members, although thousands of Arabs from many countries did the same. US intelligence agencies have found no evidence of any substantive collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. While Colin Powell’s statement to the UN may have been accepted as proof by many in the US, this was not the case in Europe.[citation needed]

Powell himself stated later:[5] “I, of course, regret the U.N. speech that I gave,” he said, “which became the prominent presentation of our case. But we thought it was correct at the time. The President thought it was correct. Congress thought it was correct.” In a February 2003 speech to the U.N. Security Council, Powell alleged that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction from inspectors and refusing to disarm. However, after the U.S. had invaded Iraq and overthrown Saddam Hussein, no weapons of mass destruction were found. “Of course I regret that a lot of it turned out be wrong,” he said. In an unbroadcast interview for Frontline (U.S. TV series) in May 2016, Powell said, “at the time I made the speech [to the UN]…the President [George W. Bush] had already made this decision for military action.”
UN Chief Inspector Hans Blix, on 14 February 2003, presented a report to the Security Council. Blix gave an update of the situation in Iraq, and he stated that the Iraqis were now more proactive in their cooperation. He also rebutted some of the arguments proposed by Powell. Blix questioned the interpretations of the satellite images put forward by Powell, and stated that alternate interpretations of the satellite images were credible. He also stated that the Iraqis have in fact never received early warning of the inspectors visiting any sites (an allegation made by Powell during his presentation). International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed ElBaradei also said that he did not believe the Iraqis have a nuclear weapons program, unlike what Powell had claimed.

This report of February 14 and the protests of February 16 appear to have created reluctance in some of the members of the Security Council over the proposed war on Iraq. A second resolution was being drafted with the intention that it would find Iraq in “material breach” and the “serious consequences” of Resolution 1441 should be implemented.
On 7 March 2003, Blix made his twelfth quarterly report on the status of UNMOVIC’s efforts to verify Iraq’s disarmament. A transcript of his presentation is available at CNN.
As George W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave power, the UN pulled out all the inspectors from Iraq. Days later the invasion began.

United States – The US maintained that Iraq was not cooperating with UN inspectors and had not met its obligations to 17 UN resolutions. The US felt that Resolution 1441 called for the immediate, total unilateral disarmament of Iraq and continued to show frustration at the fact that months after the resolution was passed Iraq was still not, in its view, disarming. Language in Resolution 1441 recalled that the use of “all means necessary” was still authorized and in effect from Resolution 678, and therefore maintained that if Iraq failed to comply with the “one final chance to comply” provision of Resolution 1441, then military action would be the result.
United Kingdom – Within the Security Council, the UK was the primary supporter of the US plan to invade Iraq. Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly and vigorously supported US policy on Iraq, and portrayed himself as exerting a moderating influence on Bush. British public opinion polls in late January showed that the public support for the war was deteriorating. It had fallen from 50 percent to 30 percent by March.
France – On 20 January 2003, Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said, “We think that military intervention would be the worst possible solution,” although France believed that Iraq may have had an ongoing chemical and nuclear weapons program. Villepin went on to say that he believed the presence of UN weapons inspectors had frozen Iraq’s weapons programs. France also suggested that it would veto any resolution allowing military intervention offered by the US or Britain. The most important French speech during the crisis was made by De Villepin at the Security Council on the 14 February 2003, after Hans Blix presented his detailed report (see below). De Villepin detailed the three major risks of a “premature recourse to the military option”, especially the “incalculable consequences for the stability of this scarred and fragile region”. He said that “the option of war might seem a priori to be the swiftest, but let us not forget that having won the war, one has to build peace”. He emphasized that “real progress is beginning to be apparent” through the inspections, and that, “given the present state of our research and intelligence, in liaison with our allies”, the alleged links between al-Qaeda and the regime in Baghdad explained by Colin Powell were not established. He concluded by referring to the dramatic experience of “old Europe” during World War II. This “impassioned” speech “against war on Iraq, or immediate war on Iraq”, won “an unprecedented applause”, reported the BBC’s Sir David Frost (BBC News). The complete text is available at the Embassy of France in the United States. Britain and the US sharply criticized France for this position in March 2003.[citation needed]
Russia – On the same day, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that “Russia deems that there is no evidence that would justify a war in Iraq.” On January 28, however, Russia’s opinion had begun to shift following a report the previous day by UN inspectors which stated that Iraq had cooperated on a practical level with monitors, but had not demonstrated a “genuine acceptance” of the need to disarm. Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that he would support a US-led war if things did not change and Iraq continued to show a reluctance to completely cooperate with inspection teams. However, Putin continued to stress that the US must not go alone in any such military endeavor, but instead must work through the UN Security Council. He also stressed the need for giving the UN inspectors more time. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also garnered unusual applause inside the chamber with his speech against the war.[citation needed]
China – On January 23, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Beijing was “worried and uneasy about the large-scale military build-up” in the Gulf region and that China’s position on potential war with Iraq was “extremely close” to France’s. Although the People’s Republic of China voted in favor of UNSCR 1441, Chinese officials repeatedly spoke in support of a diplomatic solution, including continued weapons inspections.[8]
Germany – On January 22, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, at a meeting with French president Jacques Chirac, said that he and Chirac would do all they could to avert war. At the time, Germany was presiding over the Security Council.
Angola – Angola supported continued inspections, but had not taken a stand on disarmament by military action.
Bulgaria – Bulgaria suggested that it would support the use of military force to disarm Iraq, even without UN backing.
Cameroon – Cameroon encouraged the continued inspections, but had not taken a firm stand on whether the country would support a US led strike to invade Iraq.
Chile – Chile indicated that it would like inspections to continue, but had not taken a position on the use of military force to disarm Iraq.
Guinea – Guinea supported further inspections, but had not taken a position on the use of military force to disarm Iraq.
Mexico – Mexico supported further inspections, and hinted that it would support a US-led military campaign if it were backed by the UN. The country also hinted that it might consider supporting a military campaign without UN backing as well. President Vicente Fox heavily criticized the war when it started and Mexican diplomats described their conversations with US officials as hostile in tone and that Washington was demonstrating little concern for the constraints of the Mexican government whose people were overwhelmingly opposed to the war with Iraq. (USA Today)
Pakistan – Pakistan supported continued inspections.
Syria – Syria felt that Iraq was cooperating and meeting its obligations under UN resolutions. Syria would have liked to see the crippling UN sanctions on Iraq lifted.
Spain – Spain supported the US’s position on Iraq and supported the use of force to disarm Iraq, even without UN approval.
Analysis Edit
According to Britain, a majority of the UN Security Council members supported its proposed 18th resolution which gave Iraq a deadline to comply with previous resolutions, until France announced that they would veto any new resolution that gave Iraq a deadline. However, for a resolution to pass, a supermajority of 9 out of 15 votes are needed. Only four countries announced they would support a resolution backing the war.[9]

In the mid-1990s, France, Russia and other members of the UN Security Council asked for sanctions on Iraq to be lifted. The sanctions were criticized for making ordinary people suffer and being the cause of a humanitarian catastrophe leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths.[10]

The Institute for Policy Studies published a report[11] analyzing what it called the “arm-twisting offensive” by the United States government to get nations to support it. Although President Bush described nations supporting him as the “coalition of the willing”, the report concluded that it was more accurately described as a “coalition of the coerced.” According to the report, most nations supporting Bush “were recruited through coercion, bullying, and bribery.” The techniques used to pressure nations to support the United States included a variety of incentives including:

Promises of aid and loan guarantees to nations who supported the US
Promises of military assistance to nations who supported the US
Threats to veto NATO membership applications for countries who don’t do what the US asked
Leveraging the size of the US export market and US influence over financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Deciding which countries receive trade benefits under such laws as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which, as one of its conditions for eligibility for such benefits, requires that a country does “not engage in activities that undermine United States national security interests”.
Deciding what countries it should buy petroleum from in stocking its strategic reserves. The US has exerted such pressure on several oil-exporting nations, such as Mexico.

In addition to the above tactics, the British newspaper The Observer published an investigative report revealing that the National Security Agency of the United States was conducting a secret surveillance operation directed at intercepting the telephone and email communications of several Security Council diplomats, both in their offices and in their homes. This campaign, the result of a directive by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, was aimed primarily at the delegations from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan. The investigative report cited an NSA memo which advised senior agency officials that it was “‘mounting a surge’ aimed at gleaning information not only on how delegations on the Security Council will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but also ‘policies’, ‘negotiating positions’, ‘alliances’ and ‘dependencies’ – the ‘whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises’.”
The story was carried by the European and Australian press, and served as a further embarrassment to the Bush administration’s efforts to rally support for an invasion of Iraq. Wayne Madsen, who was a communications security analyst with the NSA in the 1980s, believes the memo is authentic and believes the memo was aimed at other nations who are part of the ECHELON intelligence network, namely Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK. Additionally, a member or Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Katharine Gun was charged under the Official Secrets Act 1989 in connection with the leaking of the memo. She stated her intention to plead not guilty on the grounds that her actions were justified to prevent an illegal war. The case against her was dropped after the prosecution declined to present any evidence at her trial.[13]

Clare Short, a British cabinet minister who resigned in May 2003 over the war, stated in media interviews that British intelligence regularly spied on UN officials. She stated that she had read transcripts of Kofi Annan’s conversations.
In 2004 and 2005 Colin Powell acknowledged that much of his 2003 UN presentation was inaccurate:

I looked at the four [sources] that [the CIA] gave me for [the mobile bio-labs], and they stood behind them, … Now it appears not to be the case that it was that solid. At the time I was preparing the presentation, it was presented to me as being solid.[14] April 3, 2004

I feel terrible … [giving the speech] … It’s a blot. I’m the one who presented it on behalf of the United States to the world, and [it] will always be a part of my record. It was painful. It’s painful now. Sep 8, 2005.

The report’s “additional views “Phase two” of the investigation
May 22, 2017

The Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted unanimously to approve the finished report. There were, however, significant areas of disagreement, with those disagreements being expressed in the form of “additional views” attached at the end of the report proper.

Senators Roberts, Hatch, and Bond Edit
Further information: Senate Reports of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq pertaining to Joseph C. Wilson’s Niger trip
In the first “additional view” attached to the report, Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS), joined by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Christopher Bond (R-MO), presents two conclusions that Democratic members of the Committee were unwilling to include in the report, even though, according to Roberts, “there was no dispute with the underlying facts.” Those two conclusions related to the actions of Joseph Wilson, the former ambassador who was sent to Niger in 2002 to investigate allegations that the Iraqi government was attempting to purchase “yellowcake” uranium, presumably as part of an attempt to revive Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The two conclusions were that the plan to send Wilson to investigate the Niger allegation was suggested by Wilson’s wife, a CIA employee, and that in his later public statements criticizing the Bush administration, Wilson included information he had learned from press accounts, misrepresenting it as firsthand knowledge.

This additional view also discusses the question of pressure on analysts, and recommends caution in implementing reforms in the intelligence community.

Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin Edit
Senators John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) (the Committee’s vice-chairman), Carl Levin (D-MI), and Richard Durbin (D-IL), used their additional view to say that the report painted an incomplete picture, because the Committee had put off until phase two of the investigation the key question of “how intelligence on Iraq was used or misused by Administration officials in public statements and reports.” Because of this, they said, “the Committee’s phase one report fails to fully explain the environment of intense pressure in which Intelligence Community officials were asked to render judgments on matters relating to Iraq when policy officials had already forcefully stated their own conclusions in public.”

Senators Chambliss, Hatch, Lott, Hagel, and Bond Edit
The third additional view in the report is by Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), with Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Trent Lott (R-MS), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Christopher Bond (R-MO). It focuses on the issues of information sharing and Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and rebuts the allegation of “pressure” contained in the additional view by Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin.

Other additional views Edit
Senator Olympia Snow (R-ME) wrote in her additional view that the Committee’s report revealed poor management and a lack of accountability in the intelligence community, and she called for strong reforms.

Senator John Warner (R-VA) used his additional view to defend the integrity and professionalism of front-line intelligence analysts, and to emphasize that “there was no evidence that anyone involved in reaching intelligence judgments for this NIE was subjected to any pressure from their superiors or from policymakers to alter any of their judgments or analyses.”

The additional view by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), was critical of the Bush administration, saying it “did not fairly represent the intelligence.”
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) was also critical of the Bush administration in his additional view, giving a list of public statements by senior members of the administration that misstated and exaggerated the underlying intelligence on Iraq.

Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) focused on the need for greater accountability for the intelligence failures identified in the report.

Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) used her additional view to argue for a number of specific structural and procedural reforms in the intelligence community.
At the time of the report’s release (July 9, 2004), Democratic members of the committee expressed the hope that “phase two” of the investigation, which was to include an assessment of how the Iraqi WMD intelligence was used by senior policymakers, would be completed quickly. Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) said of phase two, “It is a priority. I made my commitment and it will get done.”

On March 10, 2005, during a question-and-answer session after a speech he had given at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Senator Roberts said of the failure to complete phase two, “[T]hat is basically on the back burner.” Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), vice chairman of the Committee, made a statement later that day in which he said, “The Chairman agreed to this investigation and I fully expect him to fulfill his commitment…. While the completion of phase two is long overdue, the committee has continued this important work, and I expect that we will finish the review in the very near future.”

In a statement regarding the release of the report of the presidential WMD commission on March 31, 2005, Senator Roberts wrote, “I don’t think there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all regarding prewar intelligence. I think that it would be a monumental waste of time to replow this ground any further.”

On April 10, 2005, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller appeared together on NBC’s Meet the Press program. In response to a question about the completion of phase two of the investigation, Roberts said, “I’m perfectly willing to do it, and that’s what we agreed to do, and that door is still open. And I don’t want to quarrel with Jay, because we both agreed that we would get it done. But we do have–we have Ambassador Negroponte next week, we have General Mike Hayden next week. We have other hot-spot hearings or other things going on that are very important.”

Moderator Tim Russert then asked Senator Rockefeller if he believed phase two would be completed, and he replied, “I hope so. Pat and I have agreed to do it. We’ve shaken hands on it, and we agreed to do it after the elections so it wouldn’t be any sort of sense of a political attack. I mean that was my view; it shouldn’t be viewed that way.”

On August 2, 2005, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) released the text of a letter she had sent to Senator Roberts, saying, in part, “I am increasingly dismayed by the delay in completing the Committee’s ‘Phase II’ investigation into intelligence prior to the Iraq War…. I stand ready to participate in this investigation in any way possible.”

On November 1, 2005, Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), the Senate minority leader, invoked a seldom-used provision of the Senate rules to place the body in a closed session. During a three-and-a-half hour discussion, agreement was reached on the creation of a six-member Senate panel to report by November 14 on “the intelligence committee’s progress of the phase two review of the prewar intelligence and its schedule for completion.”[5]

On April 26, 2006, an article by journalist Alexander Bolton in the Congressional journal The Hill reported that Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS) was seeking to further divide the phase two report. Under Roberts’ new approach, the following components of the report would be released relatively quickly: pre-war intelligence assessments of post-war Iraq, postwar findings in Iraq regarding WMD and ties to terrorism, and the use by US intelligence of information supplied by the Iraqi National Congress. Two components of the report would be delayed: whether public statements before the war by senior government officials were supported by the underlying intelligence, and the role played by the Department of Defense’s Office of Special Plans in developing the prewar intelligence.
A September 7, 2006, article by journalist Jonathon Weisman in the Washington Post reported that the part of the phase two report comparing the Bush administration’s public statements about Saddam Hussein with the evidence senior officials reviewed in private would not be released before the November 2006 election.[7]

Two volumes of the phase II report were released on September 8, 2006: “Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments” and “The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress.”

After Democrats gained a majority in the Senate during the 2006 midterm election, chairmanship of the committee passed to Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV). The former chair, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) left the committee; the ranking Republican and vice chairman of the committee is now Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO).

On May 25, 2007, the committee released a volume of the phase II report titled, “Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq”. This volume of the report includes seven pages of conclusions regarding assessments provided by the intelligence community to U.S. government leaders prior to the Iraq war. The report concludes that the intelligence community had assessed that establishing a stable government in Iraq would be a “long, difficult, and probably turbulent challenge,” that Iraqi society was deeply divided and would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power took steps to prevent it, and that the war would increase the threat of terrorism, at least temporarily. The intelligence community also assessed that a U.S. defeat and occupation of Iraq would lead to a surge in political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups, and that the war would not cause other countries in the region to abandon their WMD programs.

This volume of the report includes an appendix containing two previously classified reports by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) titled, “Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq” and “Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq”, as well as a long list of recipients within the government of NIC assessments on Iraq. The appendix also contains a number of “Additional Views” in which different members of the committee comment on the history of the committee’s work in this area, and criticize what they characterize as the politicization of that work by members of the other party.

Phase II of the report was publicly released on Thursday June 5, 2008 whether statements by US Government officials were substantiated by intelligence reports.

This was a bi-partisan majority report (10-5) and “details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.” It concludes that the US Administration “repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.” These included President Bush’s statements of a partnership between Iraq and Al Qa’ida, that Saddam Hussein was preparing to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, and Iraq’s capability to produce chemical weapons.
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.Jay Rockefeller, stated in press release of report’s publication“It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa’ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa’ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses. While the report highlights many of the problems with the intelligence and criticizes the Bush Administration for its handling of the lead up to the war and its reasons for doing so, the report also supports in many cases that claims made by the Bush Administration about Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction programs were “generally substantiated by the intelligence”.

“There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate.”

The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sen.Jay Rockefeller twice alleged that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or its former head Douglas Feith may have engaged in unlawful activities,[8] Phase II of the report “found nothing to substantiate that claim; nothing unlawful about the “alleged” rogue intelligence operation in the PCTEG , nothing unlawful about the Office of Special Plans, and nothing unlawful about the so-called failure to inform Congress of alleged intelligence activities.”[8] The previous year, the chairman released a press statement claiming that it appeared that the office’s were “not in compliance with the law.”[8] Yet, rather than pursue these allegations, Rockfeller decided to pursue an issue unrelated to the intelligence, and unrelated to Iraq.[8] He pursued and inquiry of an exploratory meeting held in Rome in 2001 between two DOD officials and two Iranians.[8] Writing for the Minority Opinion as part of the report it was stated that “After four years of making unsubstantiated allegations of unlawful activities, the calculus appears to be that proclamations of “inappropriate” behavior will generate the desired headlines focusing only on the caustic words, rather than the lack of substance behind them. We hope that these additional views will help redirect that focus to the evidence, or lack thereof.”[8]

Despite House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s telling her caucus members “that impeachment is off the table; she is not interested in pursuing it,”[9] Dennis Kucinich D-Ohio introduced a formal resolution to the House of Representatives in an attempt to impeach President George W. Bush from the White House.[10] House Democrats unanimously voted to send it to a committee; a maneuver that essentially killed Kucinich’s efforts.

Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq
May 21, 2017

The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence (formally, the “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq”) was the report by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the U.S. intelligence community’s assessments of Iraq during the time leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The report, which was released on July 9, 2004, identified numerous failures in the intelligence-gathering and -analysis process. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and the American public.

The Committee’s Republican majority and Democratic minority agreed on the report’s major conclusions and unanimously endorsed its findings. They disagreed, though, on the impact that statements on Iraq by senior members of the Bush administration had on the intelligence process. The second phase of the investigation, addressing the way senior policymakers used the intelligence, was published on May 25, 2007. Portions of the phase II report not released at that time include the review of public statements by U.S. government leaders prior to the war, and the assessment of the activities of Douglas Feith and the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans.
After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq agreed to destroy its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and dismantle its WMD programs. To verify compliance, UN inspection teams were to be given free access to the country. Over the next seven years, inspectors sometimes complained about non-cooperation and evasiveness by the Iraqi government. Iraqi officials in turn complained that some weapons inspectors were acting as spies for foreign intelligence agencies. In 1998, after a critical report on the Iraqi government’s noncompliance was issued by UN weapons inspector Richard Butler, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that he would launch airstrikes on Iraqi targets (See Operation Desert Fox). Butler evacuated his inspectors and the bombing proceeded. After the bombing campaign, Iraq refused to allow weapons inspectors to re-enter the country.

After George W. Bush became president in January 2001, and especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government increased its attention on Iraq. In the first half of 2002, a series of public statements by President Bush and senior members of his administration indicated a willingness to use force, if necessary, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On October 1, 2002, the CIA delivered a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessing the threat represented by Iraq’s WMD activities. Three days later, CIA Director George Tenet published an unclassified white paper on the subject of Iraq’s WMD capabilities. Over the next two weeks, a joint resolution authorizing the use of force was passed by both houses of Congress.

Over the next several months the U.S. conducted a diplomatic effort at the United Nations, seeking to obtain that body’s approval for a new WMD inspection regime, and, potentially, for the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government. The UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling on Iraq to make “an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure” of its WMD programs, and threatening “serious consequences” if it did not comply. In the wake of resolution 1441, Iraq allowed UN weapons inspectors to return to the country. While the inspections were taking place, the U.S. continued to lobby the members of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq. As part of that effort U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003, in which he detailed U.S. intelligence findings regarding Iraqi WMD. Faced with the opposition of a majority of the Security Council’s members, including Germany, France, and Russia, the U.S. abandoned the effort to obtain an explicit use-of-force authorization from the UN.
On March 20, 2003, the U.S. and its allies invaded Iraq, an action that led to the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein.

Over the ensuing year, U.S. and allied forces searched for evidence supporting the pre-invasion claims about Iraqi WMD stockpiles and programs. The lead role in this search was played by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), consisting of investigators from the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA. Although scattered remnants of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles from the time of the 1991 Gulf War were found, the ISG’s final report concluded that Iraq did not possess significant WMD capabilities at the time of the invasion Iraq. The ISG also stated that Iraq had intended to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped.

As these facts were emerging in June, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, announced that the Committee, as part of its regular oversight responsibility, would conduct a “thorough and bipartisan review” of Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorist groups. On June 20, 2003, Senator Roberts and Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), the Committee’s vice-chairman, issued a joint press release announcing that the committee would conduct a detailed review of the Iraqi WMD intelligence process, including the following areas:

the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein’s threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people;
the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;
whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;
whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and
other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee’s review.
The following nine Republicans were members of the Committee at the time the investigation was launched: Committee Chairman C. Patrick Roberts (R-KS), Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), R. Michael DeWine (R-OH), Christopher S. “Kit” Bond (R-MO), C. Trent Lott (R-MS), Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), Charles Hagel (R-NE), C. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), and John W. Warner (R-VA).

The following eight Democrats made up the rest of the Committee: Vice-Chairman John D. “Jay” Rockefeller IV (D-WV), Carl Levin (D-MI), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Ronald L. Wyden (D-OR), Richard J. Durbin (D-IL), B. Evans “Evan” Bayh III (D-IN), Johnny R. “John” Edwards (D-NC), and Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD).
In the course of the investigation, Committee staff reviewed more than 30,000 pages of documentation provided by the intelligence community. The Committee requested that it be supplied copies of the President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) concerning Iraq’s WMD capabilities and ties to terrorism, but the White House denied that request. An article by journalist Murray Waas has described a specific controversy over the PDB for September 21, 2001, which allegedly said that the US intelligence community had “no evidence” linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11 attacks, and “scant credible evidence” that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with al Qaeda. [1]

Committee staff also interviewed more than 200 people, including intelligence analysts and senior officials with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and other federal entities involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The Committee also held a series of hearings on the intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorism.

On February 12, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller announced an expansion of the scope of the investigation. The new elements added to the investigation were:

the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information;
the postwar findings about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments;
prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
On June 17, 2004, Senators Roberts and Rockefeller announced that the completed report had been unanimously approved by the Committee’s members, and that they were working with the CIA on the issue of declassification. The completed report, with blacked-out text (“redactions”) made by the CIA, was released on July 9, 2004. The report did not cover most of the new topics announced in the February 12, 2004, press release; instead, those topics were now to be covered in a separate report, to be completed later, covering “phase two” of the investigation.
The 511-page report focuses much of its attention on the October, 2002, classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The report includes 117 formal conclusions, as well as supporting discussion and background information.

General conclusions on intelligence relating to Iraq’s WMD and ties to terrorism Edit
The report’s first conclusion points to widespread flaws in the October 2002 NIE, and attributes those flaws to failure by analysts in the intelligence community:

Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
Subsequent conclusions fault the intelligence community for failing to adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties that underlay the NIE’s conclusions, and for succumbing to “group think,” in which the intelligence community adopted untested (and, in hindsight, unwarranted) assumptions about the extent of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and programs. The committee identified a failure to adequately supervise analysts and collectors, and a failure to develop human sources of intelligence (HUMINT) inside Iraq after the departure of international weapons inspectors in 1998. It also cited the post-9/11 environment as having led to an increase in the intensity with which policymakers review and question threat information.

Niger and the Iraqi nuclear program Edit
Section II of the report discussed the handling of intelligence indicating that Iraq might be attempting to purchase uranium from Niger. The report examined the role played by former ambassador Joseph Wilson in investigating the issue, and the way Wilson’s assessment was communicated within the intelligence community. It also discusses the process whereby references to Iraq’s uranium-procurement efforts were removed from some speeches at the behest of intelligence officials, but left in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address. The report concludes that prior to October, 2002, it was reasonable for the intelligence community to assess Iraq may have been attempting to obtain uranium from Africa.

Further information: Senate Reports of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq pertaining to Joseph C. Wilson’s Niger Trip
Section III of the report discusses assessments of Iraq’s domestic nuclear program. It focuses a significant amount of attention on the intelligence process that took place in the spring of 2001 regarding Iraq’s attempts to purchase 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes. The CIA concluded that the tubes could be intended for constructing centrifuges for a uranium-enrichment program (i.e., for a restarted Iraqi nuclear weapons program); analysts in the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense considered that to be unlikely.

The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq appeared to be reconstitituting its nuclear weapons program. The Committee’s report concluded that this view was not supported by the underlying intelligence, and the report agreed with the opinion of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, expressed as an “alternative view” in the NIE, that the available intelligence did not make “a compelling case for reconstitution” of the Iraqi nuclear program. The committee reached several conclusions critical of poor communications between the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community concerning this issue.

Further information: Iraqi_aluminum_tubes § Report_of_the_Select_Committee_on_Intelligence
Biological weapons, chemical weapons, and delivery systems Edit
The sections of the report concerned with assessments of Iraq’s biological weapons programs, chemical weapons programs, and delivery systems contain extensive discussion .
Committee Chairman Pat Roberts told NBC’s Tim Russert that “Curveball really provided 98 percent of the assessment as to whether or not the Iraqis had a biological weapon.”[2] This was in despite the fact that “nobody inside the U.S. government had ever actually spoken to the informant—except [for a single] Pentagon analyst, who concluded the man was an alcoholic and utterly useless as a source.”[3]

After learning the intelligence provided by Curveball was going to be used as the “backbone” of the case for war, the Pentagon analyst wrote a letter to the CIA expressing his concerns. The Deputy of the CIA Counter Proliferation Unit quickly responded by saying:

“Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn’t say. The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he’s talking about.”[4][3]

One area where the Committee found that the intelligence community’s reporting accurately reflected the underlying intelligence concerned Iraq’s retention of Scud-type ballistic missiles, and its development of new types of short- and medium-range missiles. In the case of the NIE’s reporting on Iraq’s development of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), however, the Committee found that the reporting generally was not well-supported by the underlying intelligence, and overstated what was known concerning the likelihood that the Iraqi UAVs were intended for use as a delivery means for biological weapons.

Colin Powell’s speech to the UN Edit
Section VII of the Committee’s report focuses on the intelligence behind Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the UN on February 5, 2003. The report describes the process whereby the CIA provided a draft of the speech to the National Security Council (NSC), and then, at the request of the NSC, worked to expand the speech with additional material, especially regarding Iraq’s nuclear program. The report also describes the subsequent review made by Colin Powell and analysts from the State Department with analysts from the CIA. In the speech, Powell said that “every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” Despite this, the Committee concluded that “[m]uch of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.”

Pressure on analysts Edit
The report partially looks at the question of whether pressure was brought to bear on intelligence analysts to get them to shape their assessments to support particular policy objectives. It recounts how Sen. Roberts made repeated public calls for any analysts who believed they had been pressured to alter their assessments to speak with the Committee about their experiences. The Committee also attempted to identify and interview several individuals who had described such pressure in media reports and government documents. The report says that the Committee did not find any evidence that administration officials tried to pressure analysts to change their judgments; however, an evaluation of the Bush Administration’s use of intelligence was put off until “phase two” of the investigation. (Several Democratic committee members, although they voted to approve the report’s conclusions, expressed reservations on this issue and Republicans also acknowledged that the issue of “pressure” would be examined during phase two; see below, in the discussion of the report’s “additional views”, for details.)
A white paper titled “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” was released by CIA Director George Tenet on October 4, 2002, three days after the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi WMD was released. In part, the white paper was a response to Congressional requests for an unclassified version of the information in the NIE, since that document was available only to a small group of lawmakers due to its classified nature. The white paper, although shorter and less-detailed than the NIE, was very similar to it in format and major conclusions. The Committee found that the white paper presented a significantly stronger characterization of the threat represented by Iraqi WMD than did the NIE, and that that stronger characterization was not supported by the underlying intelligence.

Iraq’s alleged links to al-Qaeda Edit
Further information: Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda
Several sections in the report examine topics relating to allegations of links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee said that the intelligence community produced reasonable conclusions on this topic, although the Committee found gaps in the intelligence-gathering methods used (Page 350).

Much of the Committee’s investigation in this area concerned the CIA’s preparation and distribution of a document titled Iraqi Support for Terrorism. An initial version of this document was distributed to senior Bush administration officials in September, 2002; an updated version of the document was provided to Congress in January, 2003. The conclusion of CIA analysts was that although Saddam Hussein’s government had likely had several contacts with al Qaeda during the 1990s, “those contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.” The CIA also attempted to determine the attitudes that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leadership held toward the possibility of working cooperatively with each other. The available intelligence in this area suggested that Iraqi and al-Qaeda leaders would be wary of working together.

The “most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons.” Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been present in Baghdad, and Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization that identified itself as the “sworn enemy” of Saddam Hussein had operated in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control. There was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al Qaeda attack. The report criticized the CIA for its lack of human intelligence resources in Iraq to assess the country’s ties with terrorism during the time prior to 2002.

In terms of pressure on analysts, the Committee said that after 9/11, “analysts were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence failure on the scale of 9/11.” The Committee concluded that this resulted in assessments that were “bold and assertive in pointing out potential terrorist links,” and that this pressure was more the result of analysts’ own desire to be as thorough as possible, than of any undue influence by the administration, for which the Committee said they found no evidence. Several Democratic members of the Committee said in the report’s “additional views” that the question had not been adequately explored.

The Giant Former Federal Commissioner Of Work, Alhaji Femi Okunnu
May 19, 2017

Alhaji Femi Okunnu, 84, former Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing and a true-blood Lagosian spoke extensively on the source and origin of Lagosians at Lagos@50. HE SAID:

There is no no-man’s land. There are always some people who are original settlers. In the case of Lagos, it’s a misnomer to say Lagos is a no-man’s land. It’s rubbish. Absolute rubbish! Lagos was peopled by the Aworis and Awori land spread from Badagry through to Ota. They settled mostly in Ikeja, a division of Lagos. The Idejo chiefs, the white cap chiefs, who are the land owning chiefs, are basically Aworis and some of them are now Obas. I’m talking about the Oniru, The Olumegbon, Aromire, Oluwa, Ojora, Oloto and a couple others.

After them, waves of immigrants, from today’s Niger State, started trooping in. I’m talking of the Tapas, the Nupes. I have Nupe blood. My father’s mother was a daughter of a Nupe man, Umoru from Idunsagbe in Lagos Island. Mind you, I’m talking of my great, great, grand-father; so you can imagine how long we’re talking about and how far our history dates back in Lagos. The Oshodi family of Lagos were originally Tapa. My wife is an Oshodi; Oyekan Oshodi. The Chief Imam of Lagos and all his great grand fathers were Tapa, owing to their vast knowledge in the Quran. Now, you would not say they are not original Lagosians because we’re talking of a history that dates back well over three hundred years.

Later we had another batch of immigrants over a period of time – those who had been taken into slavery in the North and South America and the West Indies but who had been freed following the abolition of slave trade about 170 years ago. Some of them also came in from Freetown, Sierra Leone. That’s where we have the Saro, Eko connection. They settled in the Olowogbowo area.

Then we had the Binis from Benin (present Edo State). They invaded Lagos and settled in the best part of what we now call Isale-Eko. Oba Ado and all successive kings of Lagos are of Benin. You won’t say they are not Lagosians because we are talking of hundreds of years ago.

Yes, I was coming there. The Brazilian Quarters were made up of another set of returnees: the Agustos, the Dasilva, Marinho, Pereira and their descendants, who returned from Brazil and other parts of South America. So when you talk of indigenes of Lagos. These are the people who arrived Lagos Island and environment over two hundred years ago. So there is no controversy over the indigenes of Lagos. It is complete ignorance.

The Binis took over the reign of Lagos by conquest. The Aworis were there before them. They were the original settlers. Iga Idunganran itself was a gift to Oba Ado by Oloye Aromire, a white cap chief. He owned the land that the palace occupies till today. That is why till today, we have sections of Isale-Eko with Bini connections. When you hear of Idumota, Idunsagbe, Idunmaigbo, Idun-tafa; the word idun had bini origin. And then we had some chiefs who came with King Ado. That is another wide area. But suffice to say that Obanikoro, was a medicine chief who came with King Ado; so is Ashogbon. In Bini, it is Asogbon. There is also Bajulaye, who originally was Bazuaye. So the Bini connection is very deep. As a matter of fact, the corpses of all the obas, from King Ado through to Oba Adele I, who died at about 1834, were all taken to Benin for burial. . . . .

# THE NATION 14 05 2017Benin

No More Texting While Driving, Please!
May 13, 2017

Imagine yourself riding in public utility vehicle (PUV) loaded with passengers and that include you. Imagine the driver is texting while driving on his way. All of a sudden it went to the other lane and going face to face with another vehicle.

photo is mine

photo is mine

That is a nightmare. Your life at risk just because of reckless driver texting or calling through his mobile cellphone while driving.

Fear no more because a law penalizing these kinds of drivers will effect into law. No more texting, calling, playing games while driving is strictly prohibited and if so happen you violate this law, a hefty fine and possible confiscation of driver’s license will be imposed.

The Republic Act 10913 also known as Anti-Distracted Law of the Philippines will punish drivers who engage in texting, calling, playing games and computing through mobile gadgets while driving any of vehicle.

Those who will be caught doing this will be penalize with P5,000, P10,000 and P15,000 fines for first, send and third offense respectively. The revocation of driver’s license can also be imposed to the driver. Some other commission could even face a higher penalty.

How about those making calls for emergency purposes? The law exempts them from doing so provided it’s really emergency calls. Even the drivers of ambulances, fire trucks and other law enforcement agencies are also exempted.

The move is the right thing to do with so many vehicular accidents happening in the road. Some of these drivers are engage in distracted driving, drunk driving or other causes. Distracted drivers are prone to accidents because their attention is not focus in driving but something else like mobile phones that may lead to an accident.

The road accidents caused many deaths among drivers and passengers. The security of the passengers must be strictly observed and with this kind of law,  we have the means to control the drivers in this kind of wrongdoing while driving.###